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Abstract
Scholars have proposed agency, game, resource-dependency, and transaction cost theories as a means to study
outsourcing.  Although risks faced by outsourcing firms and developers (i.e., vendors) and corresponding
agency costs have been identified, key agency constructs (e.g., firm competence, risk-neutrality of the
developer) and their linkage to outsourcing practice (e.g., monitoring, screening) have not been extensively
studied.  In this research, we extend the classical agency theory by examining the impact of risk orientation
of the outsourcing parties, application features, multi-period attributes and environmental factors on
monitoring, bonding, compensation, screening, and signaling.  By developing the agency framework, we set
the stage for future empirical testing of key outsourcing constructs and their linkages.
1 INTRODUCTION
According to industry reports, global software outsourcing is estimated to grow from $56 billion in 2000 to over $100 billion by
2005 (www.idc.com).  Outsourcing is argued to reduce development cost and time, provide access to new technology and improve
business performance (Lacity and Willcocks 1998a, 1998b).  Scholars have proposed agency, game, resource-dependency, and
transaction cost theories as a means to study outsourcing (Ang and Straub 1998; Elitzur and Wensley 1998; Grover et al. 1998;
Jurison 1998).  Although risks faced by outsourcing firms and developers (i.e., vendors) and corresponding agency costs have
been identified (Grover et al. 1998), key agency constructs (e.g., firm competence, risk-neutrality of the developer) and their
linkage to outsourcing practice (e.g., monitoring, screening) have not been extensively studied.  In this research, we extend the
classical agency theory by examining the impact of risk orientation of the outsourcing parties, application features, multi-period
attributes, and environmental factors on important outsourcing constructs such as monitoring, bonding,2 compensation, screening
and signaling.
We suggest that by considering the risk characteristics of firms and developers, in light of the application, time-related, and
environmental factors, both practitioners and researchers will better be able to understand the issues relevant to the design of
outsourcing contracts.  However, unlike the traditional assumptions of agency theory, firms (i.e., principals) tend to be risk-averse,
as they have to rely on the developer for application development (Elitzur and Wensley 1998).  On the other hand, the developer
(i.e., agent) can be risk-averse if it relies on a single firm for a large part of its business or risk-neutral if it has a fairly diverse
client base.  In this context, we consider how monitoring and incentive alignment may be influenced by both firm and developer
characteristics.  Furthermore, we consider how application characteristics may affect monitoring or incentive alignment properties
of outsourcing contracts.  We suggest that the nature of interorganizational relationships will also influence the design of contracts
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and the need for monitoring may decrease over multi-period contracts.  In sum, we argue that little attention has been paid to
issues mentioned above in outsourcing research.  Hence our research goal is to answer the question: What are the implications
of risk characteristics of the firm (principal) and the developer (agent), along with other application, time-related, and
environmental factors, for monitoring, bonding, compensation, firm screening, and developer signaling in software
outsourcing contracts?
2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
In order to answer our research question, we overview the theoretical model in Figure 1, wherein we propose that agency
characteristics should interact with application, multi-period, and environmental factors to influence the design of contracts and
the related agency costs. 
Figure 1.  A Model for Software Application Outsourcing Contracts
2.1 Firm Characteristics
2.1.1 Risk Orientation 
As the degree of risk-aversion increases, firms are more likely to be concerned about the information asymmetry due to the
potential losses associated with opportunism and moral hazard.  To mitigate this information asymmetry inherent in agency
contracts, firms need to invest in various monitoring procedures and tools (Jacobides and Croson 2001).  The monitoring systems
could be broadly classified into two categories.  First, principals could use qualitative assessments of the agents performance
based on their objectives (operational).  Alternatively, principals could use output-based control systems that rely on financial
controls to document and evaluate the agent (financial).  Hence,
Proposition 1a:  The risk-aversion of the firm is positively related to operational and financial monitoring.
2.1.2 Number of Developers
When there are many developers, the firm cannot afford to extensively monitor all of the developers using operational and
financial audits.  As operational audits are more likely to incur higher costs due to the use of expert consultants or firm employees
and tend to provide imperfect information, firms are more likely to resort to financial monitoring in the face of an increased
number of developers.  Therefore, 
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Proposition 1b:  For a given risk-aversion level of the firm, the number of developers it employs in various
software application outsourcing contracts is negatively related to operational monitoring and positively related
to financial monitoring. 
2.1.3 Technical Competence of the Firm
Possessing technical competence enables the firm to monitor the developer to uncover instances of opportunism and moral hazard.
It could be argued that a firm that is more technically competent would know the type of information that makes the developer
work in its best interest better than a firm that is less technically competent.  Nonetheless, because monitoring is expensive, the
firm has to determine the optimal level of monitoring that generates the greatest benefit.  Therefore,
Proposition 1c:  Technical competency of the firm is positively related to the effectiveness of monitoring by
the firm.
2.2 Developer Characteristics
2.2.1 Risk Orientation
Developers are vulnerable to uncertain futures of firms (e.g., risk of bankruptcy).  Tasks for which behaviors cannot be precisely
defined in advance (i.e., non-programmable tasks) and outcomes that are only partly the result of effort relay additional risks to
the agent (Eisenhardt 1989).  To safeguard against inherent contractual risks, developers would generally demand a premium
(Whang 1992).  However, when the developer builds applications for a large number of firms, it could share potential risks among
those firms.  Moreover, by diversifying application development among a large number of firms, the risk-neutral developer is able
to achieve significant economies of scale (Lacity et al. 1996).  Hence, 
Proposition 2a:  Risk-neutrality of developer is negatively related to bonding efforts and compensation
demands of the developer.
2.2.2 Technical Competence of the Developer
Key application development tasks such as analysis and design demand considerable developer expertise (Wallnau et al. 2002).
To secure technical know-how, application developers often invest heavily in relevant technologies and human capital.  A
developer who has the expertise germane to application development faces significantly less risk of project cancellation and
consequently will incur lower bonding costs (Lacity and Hirschheim 1993; Whang 1992).  Moreover, as the agency theory
highlights the importance of incentive alignment in drafting compensation schemes (Williamson 1988), a developer who has made
considerable investment in acquiring relevant technical competency has the incentive to recoup that investment.  Hence, 
Proposition 2b:  Technical competency of the developer is negatively related to bonding efforts and positively
related to the compensation demands of the developer.
2.3 Application Features
2.3.1 Application Specificity
When the developer is not entirely knowledgeable in the business domain for which applications are sought, it needs to first
understand the specifics of the problem in order to develop applications.  An application that is unique to a particular
organization (e.g., NASA space program) has greater specificity than a one that could be used in many organizations (e.g.,
consumer banking).  Hence, when the application specificity is relatively high, the developer has to expend considerable resources
to achieve a greater understanding of the problem domain during application development (Nam et al. 1996).  
Consequently, as the specificity increases, the firm is more likely to invest in monitoring schemes due to the highly contingent
nature of the application specific to its own context.  At the same time, the developer is likely to incur higher bonding costs in
order to convince the firm that it is capable of developing specific applications.  Moreover, to offset the increased effort in
developing such applications, the developer is likely to demand greater compensation from the firm.  Therefore,
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Proposition 3a:  Increases in the firms risk-aversion in conjunction with increases in application specificity
are associated with increases in the firms monitoring efforts.
Proposition 3b:  Decreases in the developers risk-neutrality in conjunction with increases in application
specificity are associated with increases in the developers bonding efforts and compensation demands.
2.3.2 Strategic Importance
Strategic importance of information systems to effectively carry out critical business processes is well documented (Sabherwal
and King 1995).  As a result, when the application outsourced is strategically important, the firm has to diligently monitor the
actions of the developer to guarantee that the application is developed as intended.  Hence, 
Proposition 3c:  Increases in the firms risk-aversion in conjunction with increases in the strategic importance
of the application being outsourced are associated with increases in the firms monitoring efforts.
2.3.3 Design Characteristics
In software design, the contracting firm expects the applications being developed to hold certain design features that would play
a pivotal role in their subsequent use.  An examination of the relevant literature reveals some of the key design attributes as
reliability and ease of use.  Developing applications that possess desired design characteristics incurs considerable cost to the
developer.  Hence, 
Proposition 3d:  Decreases in the developers risk-neutrality in conjunction with increases in the value the firm
places on preferred application design characteristics are associated with increases in the developers
compensation demands.
2.4 Multi-Period Contract Attributes
Over time, firms have a need for a variety of applications as they continually strive to improve their business processes.  In
procuring application systems, firms may often rely on certain developers who have developed applications for them in the past.
Often trust has been used to explain why a firm and a developer engage in multi-period contracts.  Multi-period contracts that
enable the formation of trust reduce the information asymmetry within a contracting relationship, which in turn affects monitoring
(Lacity and Hirschheim 1993; Sharma 1997).  As the firm contracts out multiple application development projects over time to
the same developer, it is in a better position to assess developer capability.  Therefore, 
Proposition 4a:  Decreases in the firms risk-aversion in conjunction with increases in the firm-developer
involvement in multi-period contracts are associated with decreases in the firms monitoring efforts.
Generation of reports and documents beyond those requested by the firm consumes a considerable amount of time and effort on
the part of the developer (Sharma 1997).  However, as a firm and developer engage in multi-period contracts, the developer has
a lesser need to convince firms of its non-opportunistic behavior, thereby reducing bonding costs.  Moreover, by repeatedly
engaging with a firm, the developer is better placed to assess whether the firm behaves opportunistically.  When the developer
determines that the firm deals fairly, it does not have to charge as a higher premium.  Hence,
Proposition 4b:  Increases in developers risk-neutrality in conjunction with increases in the firm-developer
involvement in multi-period contracts are associated with decreases in the developers bonding efforts and
compensation demands.
2.5 Environmental Factors
2.5.1 Firm Screening
In screening, the goal of the firm is to identify a developer who is best suited for building its applications (Bergen et al. 1992).
Because of the number and variety of developers and the nature of the signals they emit, screening plays a crucial role in
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identifying the right developer.  Accordingly, the challenge for the firm is to ascertain the relationship between signals and
performance (Spence 1974).  Given the information asymmetry in favor of developers prior to entering into outsourcing
arrangements with firms (Bergen et al. 1992), screening helps firms to identify private information about developers.  More
importantly, through screening, firms can reduce the risk of opportunism and adverse selection (Mishra et al. 1998; Wathne and
Heide 2000).  By investigating developers past behaviors, the firm will be in a better position to discover opportunistic
developers.  As weaker developers might send signals to misrepresent their abilities, screening enables the firm to identify those
who are sending true signals (Mishra et al. 1998).
When the number of developers offering application development services is relatively low, the pool of developers the firm needs
to screen is lessened.  Because the number of developer signals and other environmental clues from a smaller pool of developers
is markedly less than those from a larger pool, the need for extensive screening is reduced.  Conversely,
Proposition 5a:  Increases in the firms risk-aversion in conjunction with increases in the total number of
developers offering application outsourcing services are associated with increases in the firms screening
efforts.
2.5.2 Developer Signaling
In signaling, the developers goal is to advertise its credentials in a positive light (Spence 1974).  A developer might signal to
potential outsourcing firms that it has the best personnel in the industry and employs state-of-the-art technologies in application
development.  Developers could broadcast their experience to entice potential firms (i.e., future customers) by publicizing
prominent customer lists and testimonials of their most successful customers.  By offering warranties, the developer is able to
signal that it stands behind its products and services (Spence 1974).  Moreover, because a firm looking to outsource application
development holds considerably less knowledge of the developers than those developers themselves (Sharma 1997), by signaling,
a developer could reveal important information that may lead the firm to select it (Mishra et al. 1998). 
As the number of firms seeking application development services increases, the demand for developers services increases,
requiring much less signaling effort on the part of the developer.  When a larger pool of firms exist, the developer has the comfort
of selectively sending signals to those firms that offer it the best chance of securing a profitable application outsourcing contract.
As competition among firms for developers services intensifies, the firms will in fact seek out information about developers
themselves, requiring less signaling by developers to reveal their information.  Hence, 
Proposition 5b:  Increases in the developers risk-neutrality in conjunction with increases in the total number
of firms seeking application outsourcing services are associated with decreases in the developers signaling
efforts.
3 RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS
Our research has two important implications.  First, we develop empirical operationalization of the key agency constructs (e.g.,
firm competence, risk-neutrality of the developer) in the software outsourcing domain.  Secondly, we examine their linkage to
outsourcing practice (e.g., monitoring, screening).  
4 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
Our work offers several practical implications as well.  First, we identify when firms should monitor and when developers should
bond.  Second, we reveal the level of compensation a developer could demand from the firm.  Third, we show how the firm should
monitor (e.g., financial versus operational) the developer.  Finally, we disclose the intensity in which the firm should screen and
the developer should signal.
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